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INTRODUCTION
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT:
PERSPECTIVES FROM SOUTH ASIA AND AFRICA

Sudha Setty & Matthew H Charity*
On January 4, 2014, two sections of the Association of American Law
Schools (AALS)-the Section on Africa and the Section on Law & South Asian
Studies-hosted a joint program entitled Constitutional Conflict and Development:
Perspectives fi'om South Asia and Africa. The ambitious goal of these sections in
hosting this joint program was to bring together a diverse group of scholars to
discuss their research on constitutional development, conflict, transition, and
evolution in nations across South Asia and Africa. Recent revolutions in Tunisia
and Egypt; constitutional reform effmis in Myanmar (Burma), Kenya, and
Morocco; and continued constitutional evolution in South Afi'ica, India, and
Pakistan provide just a few examples of vast and profound constitutional changes
occurring throughout these regions. We hoped the panel presentations at the AALS
annual meeting would not only offer new research and insight, but also provoke
serious discussion among the panelists and audience members as to the
commonalities and differences among the nations and experiences discussed, as
well as the processes and the actors represented in the context of definingconstituting-the nation. We were delighted to find that our goal had been met by
this group of scholars, who presented work that ranged from advocating for
federalism-based constitutional refonn in nations with transitional governments to
discussing the importance of charismatic and dedicated law reformers toward
constitutionalism. Through the presentations, we gained a sense of the profound
differences in the constitutional situations, goals, and prospects in each nation
examined. Further, we began to understand commonalities in the struggle toward
the rule of law and a separation of powers that would be tolerated by the various
political and other stakeholders, adequately satisfy the polity, and meet at least
some of the constitutionalist goals of reformers.
Gedion Hessebon, in The Fourth Constitution-Making Wave of Africa:
Constitutions 4. 0?, considers the current constitutional reform process being
undertaken in Kenya as part of the fourth wave of constitution-making in pmis of
1
sub-Saharan Africa. Hessebon grounds his argument in the history of constitution
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1. Gedion T. Hessebon, The Fourth Constitution-lvfaking Wave of Aji'ica: Constitutions
179

180

TEMPLE lNT'L & COMP. L.J.

[28.2

making and refonn in several post-colonial sub-Saharan countries and considers
how the fourth wave of constitution-making accounts for political, social,
religious, and other fissures in Kenya. Hessebon starts off with the historical
context of a 1960s post-colonial enviromnent in which the political map of Africa
was redrawn and constitutions were developed quickly for practical and symbolic
sovereignty reasons. In this first wave of constitution-making, much like in India
and Pakistan in the late 1940s after the end of British colonialmle, the form and
tenor of new sub-Saharan constitutions mimicked in many ways those of the
withdrawing colonial powers. These constitutions proved to be unstable, giving
way to military coups d'etat and a second wave of reform that consisted largely of
amending, repealing, and suspending the initial post-colonial constitutions. The
late post-Cold War era ushered in the third wave of constitution-making to
accommodate
shifting
geopolitical
alignment
and
provide
formal
acknowledgement of human rights obligations, the same era in which South Africa
broke with its apa1theid government and moved toward progressive constitutional
design. In the fourth wave, Hessebon sees the potential for more sophisticated
reform to improve conh·ols over the executive branch, establish better institutional
elements of horizontal accountability, and allow for some regional autonomy
through a federalism structure that may reflect etlmic, linguistic, and cultural
differences in a manner that combats marginalization of minority groups.
David Mednicoff also grapples with questions of constitutional overhaul and
design in his paper, A Tale of Three Constitutions: Common Drives and Diverse
2
Outcomes in Post-2010 Arab Legal Politics. Mednicoffs analysis focuses on the
legal and constitutional refonns in Tunisia, Egypt, and Morocco in the wake of the
Arab Spring of 2011. These developments took place in systems that previously
had weak horizontal checks and balances on autocratic leaders, and Mednicoff
argues that the post-Arab Spring legal reforms were used to both legitimize and
constrain the power of these leaders. He poses a series of impmtant questions,
some of which resonate among the other symposium papers. How is power
decentralized? Does constitutional reform entail a different, more democratic
sociopolitical order? To what extent should a reformed constitution reflect Islam,
the religious majority in these nations? At the same time, are constitutions
reformed in a manner that improves rights protection for those historically
marginalized, including religious minorities, women, and less powerful social
groups? Mednicoff concludes that all three nations he surveys have decentralized
power to some extent, although sometimes in ways that legitimize the core of an
autocratic order; he also finds that little changed with regard to the constitutional
treatment of Islam and protection for historically marginalized groups, although he
sees some potential improvement in the protection of historically marginalized
groups. Cenh·al to the reform process in Tunisia was the willingness-albeit
reluctant at times--of parties to compromise on numerous fronts, including the
strength of checks on the executive, the explicit inclusion of Islamic law and
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values, and the protections for religious freedom. In Egypt, Mednicoff argues that
debate over the role of Islam in the constitutional order overtook the political
process in ways that ultimately led to the restoration of authoritarian politics at the
hands of the military. In Morocco, the 2011 constitutional redrafting was a
proactive measure initiated by the monarch to stave off a popular groundswell of
democratization. Mednicoff contextualizes these reforms in the histmy of
independent Morocco, in which new constitutions have been promulgated
regularly not only as a means to meet public demands, but also to reify the power
of the monarchy. As a result, some federalism-oriented reforms were initiated,
formal recognition was granted to the indigenous Berber language, women's rights
were articulated, and, in an unprecedented move, Morocco's Supreme Court was
authorized to engage in judicial review of executive actions. Whether this power
will allow for adjudicated contestation of constitutional interpretation is yet to be
seen.
Janelle Saffin and Nathan Willis, like Hessebon in his piece, focus on
federalism-oriented constitutional reform in Need for a Constitutional Settlement
3
to Further the Reform Process in Myanmar (Burma). The authors consider the
unworkability of Myanmar's current constitutional order, which has engendered
political instability and deep mistrust among political stakeholders. The authors
consider efforts over the last sixty years-fi·om the 1947, 1974, and 2008
constitutions to the debates of today-to create a durable constitutional system.
Past efforts, in Saffin and Willis's view, have failed because of structural weakness
that led to military coups d'etat, a lack of engagement by less powerful
constituencies, and the wariness of ethnic minorities fearing abuse by the central
government. The current question, then, is how the Burmese government can
effectively manage the process of reform to achieve constitutional settlement that
engages the populace, satisfies military stakeholders, and accounts for ethnic and
religious minorities. As in Stephen Ellmann's reflection on the importance of
individuals committed to constitutional refonn in South Afi·ica, discussed infra,
Saffin and Willis note the importance of leaders such as Daw Aung San Suu Kyi in
generating pressure toward constitutional reform, both as an outside political
protester and as a member of govermnent. The authors, seeing some of the same
potential benefits and potential pitfalls that Hessebon identified in Kenya,
encourage the Bunnese government toward a political settlement that embraces
federalism as a possible structural solution that can engage minority populations,
protect against central government overreach, reduce political manipulation, and,
hopefully, set the foundation for a shared constitutional identity that would make
Myanmar more stable and peaceful.
Maryam Khan, in Genesis and Evolution of Public Interest Litigation in the
Supreme Court of Pakistan: Toward a Dynamic TheoiJ' of Judicialization,
considers the role of a supreme court and the judiciary more generally in
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constitutional development and political constraint. 4 Khan considers the rise of
public interest litigation (PIL), in which third parties, such as non-governmental
organizations, can file a lawsuit that may be taken up by the court as a matter of
public interest. Such litigation has been an important means by which matters of
social justice have been brought before the Pakistani courts and has allowed
Pakistan's Supreme Court to take a more activist role vis-a-vis executive decisionmaking than might otherwise be the case. Khan looks at PIL as part of the longer
history of judicialization in Pakistan, a process that she sees as dynamic and
ongoing in relation to political development and turmoil. She offers quantitative
and qualitative data from 1988 to 2013 to categorize the use of PIL by the
Pakistani Supreme Court during particular periods of time, thereby allowing us to
better understand the process of judicialization in the broader context of political
contestation and interest group mobilization. Khan notes that although the court's
activism ebbs and flows, the types of PIL cases that the court decides to hear are
similar over time. Khan argues that the court has characterized certain cases as
dealing with fundamental rights so as to allow it to exercise its jurisdiction, despite
the cost of being perceived as anti-democratic, overreaching, or paternalistic
toward the political branches of government. She concludes from the court's PIL
record that its judicial activism is dynamic and is based on perceptions of its own
legitimacy, the level of political turmoil, and the shifting interests of the court and
its justices, as well as the perceived strength of political stakeholders and the
populace.
Manoj Mate's paper, Elite Institutionalism and Judicial Assertiveness in the
Supreme Court of India, 5 touches on some themes similar to those in Khan's
article, particularly in the use of PIL as pmi of the Indian Supreme Court's
development of its own constitutional role. Mate draws on field research, including
interviews with former Supreme Court justices, high court judges, Supreme Court
advocates, and other legal elites to understand the individual influences that helped
motivate the Indian Supreme Court's development of its own PIL jurisprudence.
Mate contextualizes this research in the historical and political turmoil of the postEmergency period through the more politically stable 1990s and beyond. He finds
that, particularly in the years ilmnediately after the Emergency, justices looked to
involve the court in cases involving ftmdamental rights as a means by which to
increase the legitimacy and institutional heft of the court as a powerful
counterweight to an executive branch perceived of gross overreaching and abuse.
In later years, Mate sees the court as reacting to public and elite opinion on a
number of issues and confi·onting the political branches more on matters of
fundamental rights, fi·ee speech, and the right to information, all of which are areas
in which the populace and Indian elites expected more protection from the court.
On matters of economic policy, development, and national security, Mate sees

4. Maryam S. Khan, Genesis and Evolution of Public Interest Litigation in the Supreme
Court of Pakistan: Toward a Dynamic TheOIJ' of Judicialization, 28 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J.
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judicial reticence as a result of genuine concern over the nation's economic future
and national security, as well as the elite support for neoliberal policies in the
1990s and beyond. Mate offers the theory of elite institutionalism as a way of
understanding the selective activism of the court. By considering the justices'
exposure to a variety of intellectual and professional influences and their concern
over the institutional development of the court itself, Mate gives us insight as to
the motivations of individuals in building an institution and developing the
constitutional path of the nation.
This brings us to the celebration of Nelson Mandela and Arthur Chaskalson's
work toward South African constitutionalism in Stephen EHmann's Two South
6
Afi·ican Men of the Law. EHmann offers us a close look at the work, motivations,
and aspirations of two leaders in the South African civil rights and constitutional
movements. EHmann begins with a look at multiple aspects of Nelson Mandela's
life and his engagement with the law as a practicing lawyer, a leader of a
revolutionaty movement, and as a constitutional designer and president. He first
looks at Mandela's work in the 1950s as a cause lawyer representing Africans
where few others would. He then considers Mandela's outlook as a political
prisoner tried and convicted by a profoundly structurally-flawed legal system.
Ellmann emphasizes that even through these experiences, Mandela's belief in the
possibility of a South Africa governed by a rule of law that was fundamentally fair
was clear. Ellmann then considers Mandela's work in helping to design and
implement a progressive, inclusive constitution that embedded the rule of law as a
guiding principle. EHmann next gives us insight into the life and work of Arthur
Chaskalson, a contemporary and fi'iend of Mandela who worked within the legal
system of apartheid-era South Africa toward establishing a more just system of
government and law. Chaskalson, a vocal opponent of apartheid, was one of
Mandela's lawyers in the early 1960s and continued to challenge apartheid through
his legal practice for decades. He was deeply involved in the crafting of the postapartheid constitution, looking to provide a platform for the construction of a
stable, inclusive constitutional democracy. Chaskalson served as a president of
South Africa's Constitutional Court (later called the chief justice of South Afi·ica)
in an era in which the court asse1ied itself as a protector of individual rights, using
international and comparative human rights standards to create a progressive
jurisprudence on issues including LGBT rights, socioeconomic rights, and the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty. In some ways, looking at the lives and
goals of these rather different men helps us understand the very human element at
the heart of constitutional reform effmis everywhere. Certainly we can see
parallels in the motivations and aspirations between Mandela and Chaskalson in
South Africa and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's influence as both a political outsider
and insider in Myanmar, or the individual judges in Pakistan and India debating
and considering their constitutional role and responsibility in their nations'
development.

6. Stephen Ellmann, Two South Aji'ican Men of the Law, 28 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 431
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We thank the authors of this symposium issue for giving us the opportunity to
revisit their dynamic scholarship; they offer us deep insight into individual issues
of constitutional conflict, evolution, and reform in each of the different nations
they study. In presenting their work as a group, they also helped attendees at the
2014 AALS joint program and readers here to better understand some of the
cmmnonalities of these very different nations and regions with regard to
constitutional development, the role of the judiciary and law reformers, the
challenges of constitutional bargaining and compromise, and the work in each
nation toward a stable constitutional order premised on the rule of law.

